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The Case for Intensity Targets 
William Pizer 
Abstract 
While the rest of the world has pursued absolute emission limits for greenhouse gases, 
the Bush administration has proposed an alternative policy formulation based, among other 
things, on reducing emissions intensity—that is, emissions per dollar of real gross domestic 
product (GDP). Critics of this formulation have denounced the general idea of an intensity-based 
emissions target, along with its voluntary nature and weak targets. This raises the question of 
whether intensity-based emissions limits, distinct from the other features of the Bush initiative, 
offer a useful alternative to absolute emission limits. This paper makes the case that they do, 
based on how emission targets are framed. The argument draws on four key observations: 
greenhouse gas emissions will continue to rise over the near term, absolute targets emphasize 
zero or declining emissions growth while intensity targets do not, developing countries’ economic 
development is integrally tied to emissions growth for the foreseeable future, and intensity targets 
need not be any more complicated to administer than absolute targets. 
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The Case for Intensity Targets 
William Pizer∗ 
Introduction 
In December 1997, more than 150 countries negotiated the Kyoto Protocol, a landmark 
agreement on global climate change. Signed by 84 countries, including the United States, the 
treaty would commit industrialized countries to legally binding limits on their emissions of 
greenhouse gases that threaten global climate change. These limits are expressed as reductions 
(or, in a few cases, increases) in absolute emissions levels relative to a 1990 baseline. 
Kyoto detractors have put forth a range of arguments, often focused on the protocol’s 
significant economic cost and its treatment of developing countries. Arguably, these concerns are 
a consequence of the underlying architecture and the setting of absolute emissions limits. That is, 
absolute emissions limits in the face of economic growth quickly lead to high and escalating 
costs until new, carbon-free technologies are fully developed and adopted—something that 
remains decades in the future. For developing countries, the architecture has the added 
disadvantage of appearing to codify existing disparities in economic development, making their 
participation unlikely. 
Partly in response to these concerns, in February 2002 the Bush administration 
announced its new climate policy based on a domestic goal to reduce emissions intensity—
emissions per dollar of real gross domestic product (GDP)—by 18% over the decade 2002–
2012.1 The response from the environmental community, as well as many U.S. allies, was 
skeptical at best. Critics emphasized the lack of policies beyond voluntary programs and limited 
tax incentives, as well as the lack of an improvement beyond what was achieved over 1992–2002 
(Washington Post 2002; Pianin 2002). Sometimes, but not always, this criticism extended to the 
more general idea of an intensity-based emissions limit as an alternative to the absolute 
                                                 
∗ Pizer is a fellow at Resources for the Future (RFF). Earlier versions of the paper have been presented at the 2002 
IFRI-RFF conference “How to Make Progress Post Kyoto” and the 2004 CFR conference “G20 Leaders and 
Climate Change.” 
1 It was not the first time intensity targets have been proposed; see Argentine Republic (1999). 
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emissions limits embedded in the Kyoto Protocol (and in U.S. domestic programs for sulfur 
dioxide and nitrogen oxides as well).2 
Regardless of one’s beliefs about the numerical limits or the lack of mandatory mitigation 
in the Bush plan, the question remains whether intensity-based emissions limits offer a useful 
alternative to absolute emissions limits. Do intensity targets better accommodate growth and 
make targets for developing countries more likely than absolute emissions limits? 
This paper makes the case that they do. Importantly, intensity targets are valuable in 
terms of how emissions targets are framed. The advantage to intensity targets is not so much in 
their annual indexation to economic activity, but in terms of the short- and long-term process of 
setting and resetting multiyear emissions goals. Indeed, it is probably undesirable to use intensity 
goals to adjust to unexpected deviations from forecast economic growth. 
These conclusions follow from four observations, which are discussed below: 
•  For at least the next two decades, greenhouse gas emissions will rise across 
industrialized countries, even with reasonable mitigation efforts. 
•  Absolute targets emphasize zero or declining emissions growth, while intensity 
targets do not—making intensity targets particularly sensible in the near term. 
•  The case for intensity targets is even stronger for developing countries, where 
economic development is integrally tied to emissions growth for the foreseeable 
future. 
•  In contrast to secular growth, fluctuations in emissions are not consistently related to 
economic activity, making it unnecessary (and undesirable) to adjust intensity-based 
emissions limits on an annual basis. 
Emissions Levels Will Continue to Grow 
The underlying motivation for an intensity approach is the need to accommodate 
emissions growth even as policies are enacted to reduce that growth. Without additional action, 
global emissions of carbon dioxide are forecast to grow more than 50% by 2025, with growth of 
                                                 
2 See Burtraw and Palmer (2003) and Burtraw and Evans (2003) for descriptions of the trading programs for sulfur 
dioxide and nitrogen oxides. 
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34% among industrialized countries alone.3 Forecasts for the six largest industrialized country 
emitters (the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and Japan) are 
shown in Figure 1 (along with historical emissions back to 1990). Together these six countries 
account for 80% of industrialized country emissions and 40% of global emissions. Looking 
across these countries, Canada and the United States are forecast to grow more than 40%; 
Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom, about 20%; and France, less than 5%. The increases 
in Germany and the United Kingdom are forecast to occur despite significant declines over the 
preceding decade in both of these countries. 
What explains the variation across time and countries? Well-known events in the United 
Kingdom (the end of coal subsidies) and Germany (reunification) are believed to explain at least 
part—if not the majority—of the historic decline in those countries. These events, however, are 
not expected to generate sustained reductions as both countries are expected grow in terms of 
economic activity and energy use. Looking forward, much of the variation among national trends 
can be explained by a few distinct features. Population in the United States and Canada is 
forecast to grow at annual rates of 0.8% and 0.6%, respectively, while population growth in 
France and the United Kingdom is only 0.3%, Germany is flat, and Japan is expected to decline 
by 0.1%. It makes sense that, other things equal, countries with higher population growth will 
need more energy resources—and more carbon emissions—to support extra people. In these 
forecasts, Canada and the United States not only have the highest population growth by a factor 
of two but also have the fastest emissions growth by a factor of two.4 
Another key trend is power generation, specifically nuclear. While Germany’s nuclear 
share is forecast to decline from 10% to zero over the next two decades, France’s share is 
expected to rise from 35% to 43%. Therefore, even as France’s energy use rises by 20% 
compared to Germany’s 10%, the increased use of nuclear power implies that France’s carbon 
emissions will remain roughly constant as German emissions rise by 20%. 
Can these trends be altered? On the one hand, the Kyoto Protocol stipulates a fixed 
emissions limit for participating countries, including all of these countries except the United 
States, over the period 2008–2012. Certainly there is an expectation among many that future 
                                                 
3 These and all data concerning international carbon dioxide emissions, energy use, and emissions intensity come 
from EIA (2004a; 2004b). 
4 The distinct influence of population growth, per capita income growth, energy intensity declines, and changes in 
carbon per unit of energy is often referred to as the Kaya identity (Hoffert et al. 1998). 
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targets must do even more, given that the Kyoto limits themselves—even if extended forever—
only marginally change the trajectory of forecasted climate change. On the other hand, studies of 
the cost of the Kyoto targets for these countries suggest that the necessary 25% reduction in 
emissions, implemented with a decade of lead time, would cost around $70 per ton of carbon 
dioxide at the margin, or around $90 billion annually for 2.6 billion tons of CO2 reductions.5 
Including capital and labor market impacts, the GDP impacts might be twice as much, while a 
more rapid introduction of the same emission limits could lead to even larger business cycle 
effects.6,7 
Are these industrialized countries willing to spend more than $90 billion per year, almost 
0.3% of their collective economic output, to arrest their emissions growth for 20 years?8 
Recognizing that this is a collective burden whose individual elements must be either negotiated 
or voluntarily embraced, that these costs will be borne even as emissions rise in (and likely shift 
to) key developing countries, that only a fraction of this effort will go into the development of 
zero-emission technologies necessary in the future, and that the main benefits remain even 
further in the future, the challenge is that much greater. Meanwhile, simple economic analysis 
argues that a more prudent course is to first slow emissions growth, then stop and reverse it 
(Wigley et al. 1996). For all of these reasons, it seems likely that emissions will continue to rise 
among industrialized countries for at least the next two decades. 
Intensity Targets Better Accommodate Growth 
If emissions need to rise, absolute emissions limits can still be used to slow growth. One 
can stipulate a growing or “growth” target that rises each year based on a fixed or formulaic 
                                                 
5 Data on the cost of emissions reductions is drawn from Weyant and Hill (1999). Cost estimates are based on a 
simple calculation of ½ × (price) × (reductions) by country. 
6 In competitive markets, real wages and returns to capital will fall by the added value of emissions allowances as 
well as direct reduction costs—or roughly seven times the approximate cost of a 25% reduction. Assuming 
compensated supply elasticities of 0.3, the net effect on GDP would be a doubling of the direct cost. This would 
translate into higher welfare costs if there are, in turn, tax distortions in factor markets. 
7 EIA (1998) found that the business-cycle (actual GDP minus potential GDP) impacts of the Kyoto targets were 
four times larger than the real productivity (potential GDP) costs. 
8 Technology optimists are quick to argue that costs could be considerably lower than these rough calculations 
suggest. Such arguments are based on technology expectations or assumptions about existing inefficiencies. While 
there may be some truth to these arguments, it certainly seems likely or at least possible that emissions will continue 
to grow absent a significant expenditure. 
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amount. Many labor contracts, for example, automatically increase wages based on inflation 
indicators such as the CPI.9 Businesses, in general, target growth rather than fixed levels of 
performance (Torres 2004). The academic literature on climate change considers a variety of 
emissions limits paying no attention to whether emissions caps rise or fall.10 
On the other hand, all of the real-world examples of pollution cap-and-trade programs 
involve either constant or declining caps. Federal sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide programs, 
regional caps in various states (such as the Regional Clean Air Incentives Market [RECLAIM] 
program in California), U.S. phase-out of lead in gasoline, and international limits on ozone-
depleting substances all focus on constant or declining caps. At the same time, the critics’ 
rhetoric regarding emissions caps for greenhouse gases is clear. For example, Spencer (2004), 
referring to the United States, observed that “through the Climate Stewardship Act [the recent 
proposal for an emissions cap by Senators McCain and Lieberman], our government will require 
sharply higher efficiencies to be realized, or else we’ll just have to stop producing.” And an 
economic advisor to Prime Minister Vladimir Putin noted, “In its current form, the Kyoto 
Protocol places significant limitations on the economic growth of Russia.”11 
At the heart of recent experience with emissions trading and the critics’ rhetoric is the 
fact that absolute emissions limits focus attention on the current emissions level or target. 
Current emissions become the benchmark for measuring progress as well as adjusting policy: 
increases are bad, decreases are good. The preternatural association with 1990 emissions levels 
in the climate change arena (enshrined in both the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol) is one example. Even the word “cap” suggests the 
absence of growth. 
Intensity targets, in contrast, have no natural focal point. Except in the poorest countries 
shifting from agriculture to industry, intensity naturally declines. Accelerating this natural 
decline can slow, stop, or reverse emissions growth depending on whether the decline in 
intensity falls below, equals, or exceeds the rate of economic growth. Because different countries 
grow at different rates and the differences are small, it is hard to label particular intensity goals 
                                                 
9 See BLS (2004). 
10 Nordhaus (1994) considers various paths of emissions that increase over time; Bradford (2002) specifies a 
business as usual emissions path that rises over time (at least initially). Jacoby and Ellerman (2002) suggest a phased 
approach that, while declining, might involve an initial cap substantially above current emissions levels. 
11 Statement by Andrei Illarionov, economic adviser to Prime Minister Putin, reported by Reuters (2003). 
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as good or bad without a bit of work.12 Intensity targets can also be described as performance 
standards, which not only avoids the suggestion of limiting growth but even has a positive  
ring to it. 
In summary, given the proposition that mitigation policy needs to sequentially slow, stop, 
and reverse emissions growth—and that the slow phase is likely to go on for decades—practical 
concerns argue in favor of intensity targets. Typically, if not pervasively, caps are used to reduce 
emissions, and critics often associate caps on carbon dioxide emissions with limits to growth. 
Absolute caps by their nature draw attention to stopping emissions growth. Meanwhile, intensity 
targets are easily adjusted to levels that slow, stop, or reverse emissions growth without drawing 
attention to the particular choice.13 
Intensity Targets Favor Developing Countries 
Despite the fact that developing countries are at greatest risk from global climate change, 
they continue to avoid binding commitments to reduce emissions. Arguably this is based on three 
persuasive views. First, the problem threatening the world now was caused by industrial country 
emissions—so industrialized countries should be the first ones to start dealing with it. Second, 
developing countries should be afforded the same development opportunities as industrialized 
countries, including the use of cheap fossil fuels. Third, and perhaps most important, developing 
countries face a host of more immediate and threatening problems that make concern over 
climate change appear to be a luxury of wealthy countries. 
In addition to these general arguments against developing-country mitigation efforts, all 
of the specific concerns about absolute targets are amplified in the developing-country context. 
While evidence suggests that emissions growth is related to economic growth primarily through 
population among industrialized countries, emissions growth is inextricably linked to economic 
development among poorer countries.14 Absolute emissions limits are then synonymous with 
limits to development. Even with a generous emissions limit that might allow profitable 
                                                 
12 Arguably, the Bush administration’s 18% intensity suggested the same reductions as other international and 
national targets, but it was not immediately obvious. 
13 Interestingly, environmental advocates who worry that intensity targets allow emissions growth to slip by 
unnoticed might, in the long run, appreciate that increasingly strict limits could similarly avoid notice. 
14 See recent work by Schmalensee et al. (1998). 
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emissions trading in the near term, developing countries are rightly concerned about an 
architecture that emphasizes emissions levels. 
In contrast, a focus on intensity gives many developing countries an advantage. Consider 
the case of China, illustrated alongside the United States in Figure 2. Since 1990, Chinese 
emissions intensity has been declining considerably faster than the United States and is forecast 
to continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Although a common currency comparison of 
intensity levels (rather than intensity declines) would make China look worse than the United 
States, such comparisons are conveniently problematic due to the challenges of real currency 
conversion.15 
Little can be done to assuage the initial barrage of factors that limit developing-country 
engagement on the issue in general. Nonetheless, intensity targets simultaneously remove the 
concern that industrialized countries are attempting to lock in their economic advantage through 
absolute emissions limits and use a metric that tends to favor developing-country performance. 
The hope is that this combination might be enough to secure at least voluntary commitments. 
Annual Emissions Adjustments Are a Bad Idea 
So far, the main argument for intensity targets has been that they avoid many pitfalls 
associated with using absolute emissions targets to describe a growth path for emissions. With 
this motivation, an intensity target could coupled with a given economic forecast to define a 
growth path for emissions over the horizon of the policy and then implement an otherwise 
ordinary cap-and-trade program. 
However, this idea that intensity targets better accommodate growth over time suggests 
that intensity targets might also accommodate unexpected growth in an advantageous way. That 
is, if economic activity is unexpectedly higher than forecast, should a similar increase in 
emissions not be allowed? Or if growth is lower than expected, should lower emissions not be 
                                                 
15 This would seem to raise the issue of how to define real economic activity for the purposes of computing 
intensity. However, the economic forecast could be set forth at the same time as the intensity target by stipulating 
that this bundled economic forecast (rather than some other economic information) is used to translate the intensity 
target into a series of emissions allocations. Much as Kyoto negotiations turned to sinks and the McCain–Lieberman 
Stewardship Act of 2003 focused on offsets as ways to keep the same nominal target while adjusting the real 
consequences, intensity negotiations could focus on subtly adjusting economic forecasts rather than changing 
intensity targets. 
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sought? Instead of determining emissions over the entire policy horizon with some initial 
economic forecast coupled with the intensity target, updated estimates of economic activity 
could determine the emissions level in future years. 
Despite the seeming appeal of this idea, it turns out to be a bad one. The underlying 
premise is that emissions fluctuations are tied to economic fluctuations, and that intensity 
behaves more predictably over time than emissions. Therefore, targeting intensity leads to more 
consistent effort in the face of uncertainty events; an absolute emissions target would be too hard 
in the face of unexpectedly higher growth and too easy in the face of unexpectedly lower growth. 
As Table 1 shows, however, intensity and emissions exhibit similar fluctuations from year to 
year—with the interesting exception of the United States, where intensity fluctuations are 
smaller. Otherwise, just as an absolute target could end up requiring an additional 5% reduction 
in the face of an adverse shock, so might an intensity target. 
Not only does an intensity target fail to provide a more stable target, it also flips the 
relationship between adverse economic shocks and the prospect of easier or harder targets. An 
intensity target becomes harder in the face of lower growth and easier in the face of higher 
growth. Statistically, declines tend to proceed more quickly when growth proceeds more quickly, 
reflected in the negative correlation between economic growth and intensity shown in the last 
column of Table 1. 
In other words, even though intensity is a constructive way to frame an emissions target 
that accommodates growth, annual emissions adjustments are not a great way to address 
uncertainty about economic growth. In contrast to a fixed emissions target where harder targets 
occur in the face of unexpectedly high growth, annual emissions adjustments lead to harder 
targets when economic growth is unexpectedly low, sort of a statistically regressive outcome. 
Concern about uncertainty—and the cost of uncertainty—must be addressed through other 
mechanisms. 
Conclusions 
For more than a decade, international climate negotiations have focused on absolute 
emissions targets and timetables. The result is a system that is biased toward halting and 
reversing emissions growth, even as evidence suggests that emissions will continue to grow for 
decades in industrialized countries and much longer in the developing world. This bias arises 
because progress viewed in terms of emissions inevitably means emissions reductions—not 
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slowing growth. Such a bias is arguably an obstacle to progress within many countries as well as 
internationally. 
Shifting the focus toward intensity targets opens the door to easier negotiations where a 
range of progress—including slowing, stopping, and reversing emissions growth—can be 
discussed without prejudice. Intensity targets are easily interpreted as a performance standard for 
the whole economy. Conveniently, intensity levels are difficult to compare across countries, 
promoting an emphasis on progress rather than status. Also conveniently, key developing 
countries appear favorably with larger natural declines in intensity arising from modernization. 
Alternative approaches are possible, but none appears to have these advantages while remaining 
parsimonious. 
Intensity targets are not a particularly useful way—indeed, they are a bad way—to deal 
with economic shocks that make the cost of any emissions limit uncertain. Other mechanisms, 
such as a safety valve where additional, above-target emissions are allowed at a fixed price, 
make much more sense. With that said, a safety valve mechanism could accommodate emissions 
growth even if the nominal target did not (Pizer 2002). As technology develops, mitigation costs 
fall, and perhaps the safety valve price rises, emissions growth should eventually stop and 
reverse. Although this safety valve approach can solve the domestic problems associated with 
absolute caps, the international dilemma remains. Developing countries may still view a system 
of national caps—even with a safety valve—as a way to justify the existing pattern of economic 
development. And even the domestic problems may not entirely disappear if critics believe the 
safety valve could be phased out or eliminated. 
An intensity target should be used to frame a sequence of emissions targets, not to 
establish a more complex system with annual revisions to the emissions limit. This highlights 
one of several disadvantages of intensity targets: even translating the intensity targets into an 
otherwise ordinary cap-and-trade program, those targets are necessarily harder to convey to 
stakeholders and the public than a simple emissions cap. Discussion and debate over emissions 
intensity also loses some of the resonance associated with a focus on emissions themselves. 
Finally, the intensity target’s main advantage—that it does not draw attention to zero growth as a 
benchmark for progress—will be seen as a disadvantage by advocates that seek such a 
benchmark. 
The assumptions underlying the argument for intensity targets are also subject to 
criticism. The observation that near-term targets in industrialized countries will slow growth and 
not stop it (based on cost and politics) may be wrong. Although experience and rhetoric suggest 
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that absolute targets cannot easily accommodate growth, there is no tangible impediment. And in 
the end, all of these concerns are only one part of a much larger puzzle of stakeholder and 
national self-interest, as well as competing and complementary policy issues, that must be pieced 
together to break the current logjam. Nonetheless, as individual nations and the international 
community move forward, it makes sense to give greater consideration to intensity targets as one 
piece of the policy mix. 
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Table 
Table 1. Annual Variation in Emissions and Intensity 
Standard Deviation 
Country 






United States  2.42  1.56  0.64  –0.02 
France 4.60  4.82  1.05  –0.11 
Spain 5.37  5.09  0.95  –0.16 
Sweden 7.21  7.37  1.02  –0.14 
United Kingdom  2.70  2.92  1.08  –0.42 
Japan 3.62  3.56  0.98  –0.11 
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Figure 1. Forecast Emissions Growth to 2025 Relative to 2001 levels ( = 100) 


























































































Figure 2. U.S. and Chinese Annual Declines in Emissions Intensity (Historical and 
Forecast) 
13 Resources for the Future  Pizer  
References 
Argentine Republic. 1999. Revision of the First National Communication to the U.N. Framework 
Convention on Climate Change. Bonn, Germany: UNFCCC. 
Bradford, David. 2002. Improving on Kyoto: Greenhouse Gas Control as the Purchase of a 
Global Public Good. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University. 
Burtraw, Dallas, and David A. Evans. 2003. The Evolution of NOx Control Policy for Coal-Fired 
Power Plants in the United States. Discussion Paper 03-23. Washington, DC: Resources 
for the Future. 
Burtraw, Dallas, and Karen Palmer. 2003. The Paparazzi Take a Look at a Living Legend: The 
SO2 Cap-and-Trade Program for Power Plants in the United States. Discussion Paper 03-
15. Washington, DC: Resources for the Future. 
Washington Post. 2002. Bush Climate Plan Gets Cold Shoulder; Alternative to Kyoto Protocol 
Bashed on Eve of Asia Tour. Feb. 16, A22. 
EIA (Energy Information Administration). 1998. Impacts of the Kyoto Protocol on U.S. Energy 
Markets and Economic Activity. Washington, DC: Energy Information Administration. 
———. 2004a. International Energy Annual 2002. Washington, DC: EIA. 
———. 2004b. International Energy Outlook Washington, DC: EIA. 
Hoffert, M.I., Ken Caldeira, Atul Jain, Erik Haites, L.D. Danny Harvey, Seth D. Potter, Michael 
Schlesinger, Stephen Schneider, Robert Watts, Tom Wigley, and Donald Wuebbles. 
1998. Energy Implications of Future Stabilization of Atmospheric CO2 Content. Nature 
395: 881–884. 
Jacoby, Henry D., and A. Denny Ellerman. 2002. The Safety Valve and Climate Policy. 
Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
Nordhaus, William D. 1994. Managing the Global Commons. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Pianin, Eric. 2002. Bush Touts Greenhouse Gas Plan. Washington Post, Feb. 14, A1. 
Pizer, William. 2002. Combining Price and Quantity Controls to Mitigate Global Climate 
Change. Journal of Public Economics 85(3): 409–434. 
Reuters. 2003. Russia: Kyoto Pact Harms Economy. Dec. 2. http://www.CNN.com. 
14 Resources for the Future  Pizer  
Schmalensee, Richard, Thomas Stoker, and Ruth Judson. 1998. World Carbon Dioxide 
Emissions: 1950–2050. Review of Economics and Statistics 80(1): 15–27. 
Spencer, Roy. 2004. The Economic Hardship Act [online]. Tech Central Station 2004. 
http://www.techcentralstation.com/070704D.html. Accessed Aug. 23, 2004. 
Torres, Nichole. 2004. Life in the Fast Lane. Entrepreneur, March. 
BLS (U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics). 2004. Consumer Price Indexes, 
Overview. http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpiovrvw.htm. Accessed Aug. 23, 2004. 
Weyant, John P., and Jennifer Hill. 1999. The Costs of the Kyoto Protocol: A Multi-Model 
Evaluation, Introduction and Overview. Energy Journal Special Issue. 
Wigley, T.M.L., R. Richels, and J.A. Edmonds. 1996. Economic and Environmental Choices in 
the Stabilization of Atmospheric CO2 Concentrations. Nature 379: 240–243. 
 
15 